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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN CONFLICT:
THE PRICE OF A MATURING DEMOCRACY
HARLAN LOEB* AND DAVID ROSENBERG**
Describing the United States Constitution as a "living" and "breath-
ing" document evokes a variety of reactions, from the interpretavist view
that circumstances change while the corpus of the Constitution does not,
to the evolutionist perspective which posits that the Constitution was
designed to be dynamic. Both views, however, recognize that the success
of this experiment in democracy has been correlated to the protection of
certain fundamental rights explicitly protected under the Constitution.
But the Constitution's civil rights protections are not the end of the
story. Congress, along with state and local legislatures, is constantly
passing new laws that fill in the gaps not addressed in the Constitution
itself. Inevitably, some of the civil rights created by such laws come into
conflict with constitutional rights, and courts are called upon to deter-
mine which right should receive greater deference.
Several Supreme Court decisions in the last year alone have ad-
dressed individual rights that derive from a broad variety of sources-
constitutional, legislative, and judicial. These rights, of course, are ulti-
mately dependent upon the Supreme Court's recognition of the legiti-
macy of their origin whether as a constitutional right, legislation, or
judicial extrapolation. In three cases, the Court voided a legislative
enactment on civil rights-but the effects on personal freedom -were
extremely varied in each case.
Early in the 2000 Term, the Supreme Court struck down an impor-
tant provision of the Violence Against Women Act because Congress did
not have the power to pass the Act under the Commerce Clause; the case
was United States v. Morrison.1 This decision plainly weakened the
federal government's role in strengthening women's rights to be free
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Professor of Law at Northwestern University Law School. He graduated cur laude from the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School in 1991 and is a council member of the ABA's Section on Individual
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1. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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from domestic violence. 2 More broadly, it further weakened Congress'
already-limited ability to legislate protection of civil rights under the
Commerce Clause. 3
In a case that serves as a kind of inverse to the Morrison decision,
the Supreme Court upheld a civil rights protection by striking down a
congressional attempt to limit that right. In Dickerson v. United States,4
the Court held that Congress could not pass legislation trumping the
Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.5 Citing City of Boerne v. Flores6
the case that found the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
unconstitutional, the Court said, "Congress may not legislatively super-
sede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution." 7 Thus,
Dickerson represents an instance in which a constitutional right first
elucidated by the judiciary-the right to remain silent-defeated an
attempt by the legislature to override it. Here, a limit on congressional
power translated into a victory for civil rights protections.
Finally, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,8 the Court held that a
constitutional civil right-freedom of association-defeated an attempt
by a state to create a competing right-freedom from discrimination
based on sexual orientation. In Dale, the Court said that New Jersey
could not enforce its anti-discrimination law against the Boy Scouts
because the group had a First Amendment right to exclude certain
groups-in this case, gays-from its membership rolls.
In all three of these recent cases, the legislative attempt to expand or
modify a civil right was defeated in the face of a competing constitution-
al claim: either a First Amendment right or a limit on congressional
power. It remains to be seen how federal courts, Congress, and state
legislatures will respond to these pivotal rulings. But for nearly a decade,
we have had the opportunity to observe how courts and legislatures have
responded to the judicial evisceration of the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion 9 and the inevitable conflict between religious
rights and anti-discrimination laws.
2. The decision could likely also prevent any expansion of the federal government's role in legis-
lating against so-called hate crimes. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act, currently before Congress, also
draws on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. H.R. 74, 107th Cong. (2001). If it fails, hate
crimes, like domestic violence, will remain predominantly matters for the state courts.
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1963).
6. 521 U.S. 507 (1993).
7. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332.
8. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
9. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (finding the RFRA unconstitutional).
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I. THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION V.
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The rights of religious liberty and equal protection found their way
into the United States Constitution by way of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise ClauselO and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause, ll into laws like the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1968 and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,12 and into contempo-
rary legislative efforts such as the recently defeated Religious Liberty
Protection Act (RLPA).13 As civil liberties jurisprudence has evolved,
these two values have, until recently, coexisted peacefully, even comple-
mented each other. The Free Exercise Clause allows religious adherents
the liberty to practice their religion without governmental interference,
and the Fourteenth Amendment keeps states from infringing on individ-
ual liberty by granting equal protection under the law.
While individual rights have always been one of the primary benefi-
ciaries of our democracy, a paradoxical by-product has emerged over
the last decade, which positions fundamental civil rights in conflict.
Increasingly, the civil liberties protections residing in free exercise
mandates and anti-discrimination laws derived from equal protection and
due process guarantees are colliding. A growing number of state and
federal courts are now faced with deciding claims seeking relief for
discriminatory practices that are predicated on religious grounds.
10. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 269, 303 (1940),
the Supreme Court held that the religion clauses of the First Amendment adhered to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
11. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act will be discussed at length later in this article. See
infra Part IV.
13. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). Since the fall of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, discussed infra, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives has
heard testimony regarding this bill to restore "strict scrutiny" as the proper level of review for cases
involving the free exercise of religion. While many religious organizations who supported the passage
of the RFRA also support the RLPA, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has notably not
supported the bill because its sponsors refuse to include provisions that would guarantee that the
RLPA's increased protection for religious freedom could not be used to prevent enforcement of
certain anti-discrimination statutes, such as laws banning discrimination against homosexuals in employ-
ment and housing. Speaking before a House subcommittee, ACLU Legislative Counsel Christopher E.
Anders said, "[O]ur concern is that some courts may turn RLPA's shield for religious exercise into a
sword against civil rights." Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement
on behalf of the ACLU).
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What happens when a religious university refuses to recognize
homosexual student groups,' 4 a health club managed by religious devo-
tees does not want to employ non-Christians, 15 a religious landlord does
not want to rent to an unmarried couple,1 6 or a religious entrepreneur
refuses to employ homosexuals? The dilemma is easily presented, but
the solution is elusive. Reconciling fundamental free exercise rights with
local, state, and federal laws prohibiting discrimination has quietly
developed into a defining test for civil rights jurisprudence.
This article will explore the jurisprudential history of the intersec-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause and anti-discrimination laws. In the
process, it will explain the ways in which the law reconciles conflicting
rights in other areas, in order to explore the available options for solving
the dilemma presented by the conflict between the free exercise of
religion and the efforts to eliminate certain forms of discrimination.
II. THE RISE OF FREE EXERCISE PROTECTION
From the beginning of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, the
United States Supreme Court has tried to distinguish between religious
belief and religious conduct. 17 It has determined that religious belief
receives absolute protection under the Constitution, but that government
may regulate conduct motivated by religious belief. In Reynolds v.
United States, 18 the very first Supreme Court case dealing with the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court introduced this distinction saying it was
necessary to the functioning of a democratic governmental system. 19 To
hold otherwise, the Court said, would be to "permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself."20
Reynolds upheld the application of a polygamy statute to a Mor-
mon man whose religious beliefs allowed polygamous marriages. 21 The
Court reasoned that, while the man was free to believe in polygamy, the
14. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 4
(D.C. 1987).
15. Minnesota ex rel McClure v. St. Louis Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 845-46 (Minn.
1985).
16. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999); McCready v.
Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Mich. 1998).
17. Much has been written on the impossibility of this distinction since religious belief often com-
pels certain conduct. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Con-
duct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1993) (theorizing that the belief/conduct "paradigm" continues to be the
threshold through which religious claimants must pass in order to get a favorable decision from a
court).
18. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19. Id. at 166.
20. Id. at 167.
21. Id. at 168.
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state was permitted to restrict his right to practice it.22 Taking an ori-
ginalist perspective, the Court traced the history of polygamy and cited
the Virginia law-passed just after that state had recommended the Free
Exercise Clause as an amendment to the United States Constitution-that
made polygamy punishable by the death penalty in order to prove that
the Framers could not possibly have intended to protect polygamy under
the First Amendment.2 3 This reasoning flowed from Thomas Jefferson's
comment, after the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause, that he was
''convinced [that man] has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties." 24 Since Jefferson saw no possible conflict between religious
practice and societal need, neither did the Court. It neatly compart-
mentalized belief and conduct, leaving religious adherents free to believe
in their religion, but free to practice it only if it was inoffensive to
mainstream society.2 5
Reynolds forced the Court to choose between absolute religious
freedom and state regulation of moral behavior that might allow govern-
mental burdens on religion.26 It chose regulation, as it would in a string
of later cases. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,27 for example,
the Court upheld a school's right to require Jehovah's Witness children
to salute the flag or face expulsion. 28
Just four years later, in Prince v. Massachusetts,29 the Court upheld
a statute that forbade minors from distributing Jehovah's Witness litera-
ture in compliance with their religious belief.30 The Court reasoned that
22. Id. at 164.
23. Id. at 165.
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id. at 165. The belief/conduct distinction arises in the religious context as well. In the Catho-
lic religion, even belief without conduct can cause excommunication. For instance, all Catholics are
required to believe that Mary's body rose to heaven after her death; it is infallible doctrine. The
church does not officially recognize people who do not so believe.
26. Id. at 165. The Court's choice of state regulation of marriage can be seen as a moral choice,
or as a religious choice itself, since polygamy generally conflicts with Judeo-Christian scripture. The
enforcement of mainstream Judeo-Christian morality against Mormon morality could, in itself, be con-
strued as a violation of the Establishment Clause's restriction of the entanglement of government and
religion. The First Amendment's religion clauses could be interpreted as at odds in this way. Any
governmental accommodation for one religion, in accordance with the Free Exercise Clause, could be
seen as government support for that religion, a violation of the Establishment Clause. In this situation,
when a court evidences a preference for a particular mode of "moral" conduct as more valuable than
another, it is implicitly labeling one as more valuable, and thus making it the preferred kind of conduct.
For a more detailed discussion of the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
see Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon is a Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 (1999), Andrew Rostein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763 (1993), and Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).
27. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28. Id. at 595.
29. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
30. Id. at 168.
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the state's interest in regulating the conduct of children could not be
sacrificed in this case, although it limited its holding to the facts, ex-
plicitly refusing to rule that general health and welfare concerns always
outweigh the free exercise rights of children. The Court weighed free
exercise rights against the community's need to regulate health, educa-
tion, and marriage. In its view, the Court was restricting religious
conduct without compromising the Free Exercise Clause because it was
not restricting belief.31
The same belief/conduct dichotomy appeared again in the plurali-
ty's opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown,32 in which the Court refused to force
state accommodation of minority religious belief. The dissent in this
case, however, had begun to recognize an explicit balancing approach.
Here, the Court upheld the application of a Sunday closing law to
Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers whose religion required them to close on
Saturdays. 33 The Court used the belief/conduct distinction to conclude
that the religious adherents were free to believe in a Saturday Sabbath,
but the state could not be required to accommodate their conduct, based
on that belief, by exempting them from Sunday closing laws. 34 This
reasoning allowed the Court to approve Pennsylvania's Sunday closing
law as applied to these Saturday Sabbatarians. The Court reasoned that
the law neither made criminal "the holding of any religious belief or
opinion," nor forced "anyone to embrace any religious belief . . . in
conflict with his religious tenets." 35 Although the plurality opinion held
fast to this belief/conduct distinction, Justice Brennan's dissent began to
light the way for the future of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan identified two parts of a balancing
test that would later become essential to both the law of free exercise and
to congressional and state legislation: substantial burden and compel-
ling governmental interest.36 As Mr. Braunfeld would be put out of busi-
ness if he closed his shop on Saturday, in accordance with his religious
beliefs, as well as on Sunday, in accordance with Pennsylvania law,
Brennan found a substantial burden on religion because the law forced
Mr. Braunfeld to choose between his business and his religion. 37
31. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
32. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
33. Id. at 609.
34. Id. at 606.
35. Id. at 603.
36. Id. at613.
37. Id. at 611. To this day, however, some courts refuse to view such dilemmas as questions of
religious freedom at all. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 928-29
(Cal. 1996) ("Smith's religion does not require her to rent apartments, nor is investment in rental units
the only available income-producing use of her capital. Thus, she can avoid the burden on her
religious exercise without violating her beliefs or threatening her livelihood.").
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Justice Brennan disapproved of the plurality's "deferential nod"
toward the state's claimed interest in maintaining a quiet and peaceful
day of rest for the community as a justification for denying the Saturday
Sabbatarians a right to run their businesses on Sundays. 38 He claimed,
instead, that the government's interest should be "compelling" in order
to justify such a limitation on free exercise. This state interest, Brennan
said, was not so "weighty in the constitutional scale that it justifies
the substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants' freedom." 39
This demarcation point set into motion the development of a free
exercise matrix, and Justice Brennan outlined the rules. Two years later,
Justice Brennan ushered in the "strict scrutiny" era of free exercise
jurisprudence.
In his majority opinion in Sherbert v. Verner,40 Brennan identified a
two-part test for the constitutionality of the state unemployment statute
as applied to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was unable to find employ-
ment that did not require her to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. 41 To be
constitutional as applied, the Court held, the law must either pose no
"infringement" on the religious adherent's free exercise right, or the
law's burden on free exercise must be justified by a "compelling state
interest within the state's constitutional power to regulate." 42 The Court
found that the statute did infringe on Appellant's free exercise rights,
since it penalized her for her religious beliefs by operating as would a
fine for her refusal to work on Saturdays.4 3
The Court then examined the state's interest in denying Appellant
unemployment benefits. The state suggested that exempting Appellant
from the statute might lead to fraudulent religious objections to Saturday
work and thus an unnecessary drain on state unemployment funds.
Since this claim was not raised in the lower court, however, the Court
refused to address it, although it noted that the record did not support
such a claim. 44 Furthermore, Justice Brennan added another element to
the test of a state's interest when he noted that it would be Appellee's
responsibility to show that "no alternative forms of regulation would
combat such abuses without infringing on First Amendment rights."45
38. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613.
39. Id. at 614.
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. Id. at 403.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 404. The Court was careful to dispel the argument that unemployment benefits are a
"privilege," not a "right," and therefore not subject to free exercise scrutiny. Id. The Court noted that
denial of benefits based on religious belief can constitute a denial of religious liberty. Id. at 405.
44. Id. at 406-07.
45. Id.
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This strict test of a state's interest in its laws against a free exercise
challenge did not seem to jibe with the holding in Braunfeld. The
Sherbert Court acknowledged this, however, and attempted to resolve it
by holding that the state interest in Braunfeld, providing one uniform
day of rest, was in fact compelling. 46 In his concurrence, however,
Justice Stewart pointed out that Justice Brennan's dissent in Braunfeld
clearly stated that Brennan did not find the state's interest compelling. 47
The debate over what is, and what is not, "compelling" would not end
there.
The Court conducted a similar balancing test, between free exercise
rights and state interests, when, nine years later, it held in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,48 that Amish parents were not chargeable under a law requiring
parents to send their children to secondary school until those children
reached the age of sixteen. Again, the majority used a two-part test of
statutory validity as applied to the religious adherents. The state could
vindicate its statute by showing either that it did not infringe on the
religious adherents' free exercise rights, or that the state's interest was of
a "sufficient magnitude" to override the protected interest. 49
First, the majority held that secondary school education "con-
traven[ed]" the Amish faith by exposing children to worldly influences
at odds with that faith. The state interest in educating its children be-
tween the ages of fourteen and sixteen (the children had already com-
pleted an elementary school education) was not deemed sufficient to
overcome the parents' and children's free exercise rights, especially
given that the Amish continued to educate their children in Amish
teachings and custom after elementary school. 50
In balancing free exercise rights and states' interests, the Court had
come a long way in protecting less common religious beliefs under the
Free Exercise Clause. Under a pure belief/conduct distinction, the Court
could easily have found the Amish free to believe that education past the
eighth grade was unnecessary, but then the Court could have forbidden
them from practicing that belief. Instead, Yoder implicitly criticized the
belief/conduct distinction used to decide early free exercise cases in
noting that "in this context[,] belief and action cannot be confined in
logic-tight compartments." 51 This criticism was fairly limited, however,
as the Yoder decision also distinguished cases demonstrating any
46. Id. at 408.
47. Id. at 417.
48. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Id. at 214.
50. Id. at 226-27.
51. Id. at 220.
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possible harm to the public health, safety, or order. This
standard-which would be the limit of judicial protection for free
exercise rights-served the Court well for eighteen additional years.
III. SMITH CHANGES THE RULES
After twenty-seven years of strict scrutiny of Free Exercise Clause
cases, the Court, in 1990, took an extreme departure, tipping the balance
of the equation in favor of the legitimacy of state legislation that burdens
free exercise. 52 With its decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 53 the Court abandoned the strict
scrutiny standard in favor of a standard that requires all laws conflicting
with religious beliefs to be merely "neutral" and of "general applicabili-
ty." 54 The Court held that if a law is not aimed at restricting a particular
religion or religious practice, religious adherents whose free exercise is
hampered by that law are not entitled to an exemption. 55
In Smith, the Court upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to
Native American drug-rehabilitation workers who were fired for ingest-
ing peyote in accordance with their religious beliefs. The Court seemed
to base this holding on the belief/conduct distinction, even quoting the
warning in Reynolds v. United States56 that to allow exemptions to laws
for religious belief would make every individual a "law unto himself." 57
In distinguishing earlier cases granting exemptions for religiously
motivated conduct, the Court limited the Sherbert strict scrutiny test to
the field of unemployment compensation, denying that it had ever been
an across-the-board test, and avoided overruling the case. 5 8  The
Sherbert test was not applicable in this case, the Court held, because in
Smith a criminal law (barring the ingestion of peyote) was involved. 59
The Court further distinguished previous cases by stating that those cases
involved "not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as free-
dom of speech and of the press."60 This "hybrid rights" exception,
52. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
54. Id. at 878.
55. Id.
56. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67). The decision also quotes Rey-
nolds in saying, "Laws ... are made for the government of actions, and while [government] cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98
U.S. at 166-67).
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
59. Id. at 882-85.
60. Id. at 881. As examples, the Court cited many cases where more than one constitutional pro-
tection was raised. Yoder itself was cited as a case in which the issue was free exercise combined
with parents' rights to direct the education of their children. This seems to be a never-ending loophole
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which might include combined complaints of a free exercise and privacy
or property violation, has been \cited by other courts as requiring strict
scrutiny analysis for cases involving the Free Exercise Clause coupled
with another constitutional protection.6'
While refusing to require the government to exempt religious adher-
ents from neutral and generally applicable laws, the Court noted that
such exemptions were certainly "permitted" and "desirable." 62 The
Court articulated a preference for a system where judges are not required
to "weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious belief."63
The Smith decision thus almost entirely eviscerated any protections
that \the First Amendment offers religious adherents whose ability to
practice their religion is compromised by neutral laws of general appli-
cability. For example, after Smith it appeared that religious communities
would be powerless to respond to zoning ordinances that effectively
prohibited the construction of houses of worship in certain neighbor-
hoods-if the law in question did not appear to specifically target the
practice of any religion. This seemed to leave the accommodation of
religious practices to legislatures.
IV. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND ITS
FALL
Acting on this invitation to exempt religious observance from
neutral laws of general applicability, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.64 The RFRA's aim was to
in the "neutral laws of general applicability" standard because most free exercise claims can be
combined with other constitutional protections such as freedom of speech.
Another route around the Smith standard seems to be the "individualized exemptions" exception.
The Court wrote that "where the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason." Smith, 494 U.S.
at 885. In Keeler v. City of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996), the court reasoned that when
a government enacts a law with a system of exemptions, that government has acknowledged that "its
interest in enforcement is not paramount." Id. at 886. For this reason, the court said, the government
must show that the law, when applied in this case, will "advance interests of the highest order." Id.
(quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)). In its
application of this standard in Keeler, the court held that a Catholic Church that was denied a zoning
permit to tear down and rebuild its church in order to further its religious mission should be granted the
permit. The court held that the city's interest in denying the permit, to preserve a historic structure,
was not compelling. Id.
61. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 1999) (requir-
ing that an additional constitutional claim coupled with a free exercise claim be "colorable" in order to
fall into the hybrid rights exception).
62. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The decision listed a number of states that had exempted sacramental
peyote use from their drug laws.
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). The Sherbert and Yoder standard, which the RFRA
attempted to codify, was only used for a small portion of the timeline of the Supreme Court's free
exercise jurisprudence. Commentator Eugene Volokh has criticized the RFRA strict scrutiny standard
as not really restoring the Sherbert-era standard of review, in which there was more than one test of a
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restore the compelling interest test from the Sherbert and Yoder era. The
statute required an exemption to any state, local, or federal statute for
any individual whose religious exercise was substantially burdened, even
by a law that was neutral and of general applicability, absent a
compelling governmental interest for enforcing the law against the
individual.65 Furthermore, the RFRA required, as did Sherbert,66 that no
less restrictive means of furthering that interest was available. 67 The
RFRA was endorsed by one of the largest coalitions ever assembled, and
not one member of the House of Representatives voted against it.
Congress passed the RFRA under the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement power, 68 thus allowing the law to apply to state and local
statutes as well as federal statutes. This, however, became the statute's
downfall.
The RFRA's undoing started very quietly when St. Peter Catholic
Church applied for a building permit from the City of Boerne, Texas, in
order to accommodate its growing congregation. The city, having recent-
ly designated the church's neighborhood as a historic district, denied the
permit.69  The Archbishop of San Antonio then brought suit against the
city, arguing, among other things, that denial of the permit violated the
RFRA standard. The district court, however, found that, in passing the
RFRA, Congress had exceeded its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the statute was thus unconstitutional.
In its decision in Boerne, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court and found the RFRA unconstitutional, at least as it applied to the
states.70 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement
power is remedial or preventative only. 71 This remedial power, the Court
held, allows Congress to enforce the mandates of the Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted by the Court. Congress could not, the Court
held, require the states to afford a higher level of protection for religion
statute's constitutionality when faced with a free exercise claim. See generally Eugene Volokh, A
Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). If applied as command-
ed by the text of the federal and state RFRAs, Volokh says, the strict scrutiny standard will lead to
"wrong" results in cases that require a lower standard. See generally id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
66. 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
68. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
69. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
70. There remains some ambiguity as to whether the RFRA is still good law when applied to the
federal government. The Court in Boerne held that "the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the Act's constitutionality is reversed." Id. at 536. The opinion, however, seemed to hold open the
possibility that the RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal laws by saying that "when Congress acts
within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own
informed judgement on the meaning and force of the Constitution." Id. at 535. In fact, since Boerne,
the RFRA has been found constitutional as applied to federal law. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.
1998).
71. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
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than the Constitution, required. 72 In this sense, the Court said, Congress
was substantively interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and forcing it
on the states. 73 The Boerne decision left the states to decide the
appropriate level of free exercise protection for their citizens. 74
V. FREE EXERCISE UNDER THE COMPELLING INTEREST
STANDARD
While the Supreme Court had established a comparatively low floor
of required free exercise protections, states were working to find their
own ceilings. 75 This put the states, and their courts, in a difficult posi-
tion. At what price would they protect religious liberty? How high
would the ceiling be, and what would reach it? Which values would
weigh more heavily than others would? Can a religious landlord refuse
to rent to an unmarried couple if he or she believes it would be a sin to
allow fornication on his or her property? Can a religious employer
refuse to hire a homosexual if he or she believes that to do otherwise
would be a sin?76 Where should the courts look for guidance?
These questions are not easily answered. At an almost universal
level, liberty is ensured for all Americans in the freedom to contract.
Americans are able to contract when and with whom they choose. Unfor-
tunately, however, everyone cannot have perfect liberty all of the time.
When liberty allows individuals only to contract when and with whom
they choose, whole classes of people can be excluded from all contracts,
thus being denied an aspect of liberty themselves. Anti-discrimination
72. Id. at 532.
73. Id. at 533.
74. In response, the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Kansas, Oregon,
Vermont, and Michigan have interpreted their state constitutions to require strict scrutiny for religious
liberty claims. The legislatures of Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Texas have passed statutes requiring a heightened level of protection for
religious liberty. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01 (2000); CONN. G EN. STAT. 52-571b(b) (1997); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 761.03 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (Michie 2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15
(2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (Michie 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS 42-80.1-3 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN.
1-32-40 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 110.003 (West 1999). Alabama
adopted a state RFRA as a constitutional amendment. ALA. CONsT. amend. 622.
75. The debate continues over the validity of a federal law protecting religious liberty, since
Congress is currently considering the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), a measure that would
restore strict scrutiny for all federal, state, and local laws that substantially burden religious free
exercise. The RLPA's legitimacy as applied to the states is tied to Congress' spending, commerce, due
process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities powers. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
76. In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dale, lower courts might well give greater
deference to those who discriminate against homosexuals on religious grounds. Boy Scouts of Ameri-
ca v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). It is unclear, however, to what extent the decision will apply to the
commercial context.
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laws are aimed at reconciling this injustice, codifying the societal
preference for one kind of liberty at the expense of another. 77
Free exercise rights are an extension of this idea about liberty. The
Free Exercise Clause dictates that religious adherents should not be
forced to engage in activities that violate their religious beliefs. The Free
Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution and similar clauses in
most state constitutions embody the societal value placed on the freedom
of religion. These same documents, however, call for equal protection
under the law for all Americans. After the Supreme Court's decisions in
Smith and Boerne, states were given the primary responsibility for
reconciling these values. In the following pages, we will present the ways
in which states have tried to reconcile these values already, and present a
framework for doing so in the future. States have a variety of different
options to restore the strict scrutiny standard: passing a state RFRA,
finding a Sherbert level of protection in their state constitutions, apply-
ing the Smith standard, or finding a hybrid ight. The article will focus
only on the best way to reconcile competing rights under a strict scrutiny
standard regardless of how that standard is made into law.
When courts are faced with the application of a SherbertfRFRA type
standard, they are asked to balance a "substantial burden" on religious
freedom against a "state interest" in an applicable law. 78 Usually, state
interests are categorized. Once an interest is found compelling, it
remains so regardless of the specific circumstances of the case and
77. When the Civil Rights Acts were passed, many strict civil libertarians opposed anti-
discrimination laws as violative of personal contract and property rights. This worry was recognized
in some of the exemptions included in the Act. For example, the Fair Housing Act exempts properties
with a small number of units and the property where the landlord lives. This is a compromise on a few
axes. The landlord is granted freedom of contract and property in a space that is personal to him. At
the same time, since his home is only a small fraction of the housing market, the ultimate threat to
liberty for those against whom he might discriminate is small. If larger-scale housing is available in
the market, the renter's freedom to contract will still be viable. It is notable that in the City of Chicago,
where the housing market consists mainly of smaller (2-6 flat) apartment buildings, this exemption
does not exist in the housing laws, possibly for fear that individual landlords could deny whole classes
of tenants their liberty by excluding them from the housing market.
78. In enacting an RFRA, some people might worry that states are stacking the deck in favor of
religious liberty in all cases. This should not be the case under an RFRA, however, since it was never
the case under the strict scrutiny standard. As Professor James E. Ryan said in his article, Smith and
the Religious Freedom Reformation Act: An Iconoclastic Analysis, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1412 (1992),
"despite the apparent protection afforded claimants by the language of the compelling interest test,
courts overwhelmingly sided with the government when applying that test." Similarly, since Smith,
state courts have applied an RFRA-type standard (though in the absence of an RFRA) to their state
constitutions and sided with the government nonetheless. This is possible because of the number of
hoops the RFRA standard requires claimants to jump through. A court may find that a particular law
does not substantially burden religious freedom, or that a government interest is compelling. The
"compelling" analysis can change drastically depending on the way in which the issue is framed. In a
religious landlord case, a court may find that a state has a compelling interest in preventing
discrimination in general, even if it may not have held the same for preventing discrimination based on
marital status in particular.
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vice-versa. Some interests are across-the-board compelling, but others re-
main in a middle ground. For instance, all three branches of the federal
government, as well as most state governments, have demonstrated a
commitment to fighting racism. And courts have overwhelmingly held
that race is an across-the-board compelling interest. In our free exercise
matrix, race established itself as a dominant compelling interest.
Other civil rights interests, however, do not receive such universal
deference from the courts and legislatures. For instance, some states
have passed laws criminalizing cohabitation coupled with laws banning
marital status discrimination in housing. In these cases, the competing
rights meet each other head-on in a seemingly even fight.
VI. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
It is seemingly axiomatic that a state's interest in preventing dis-
crimination based on race is compelling enough to outweigh an indi-
vidual's free exercise rights. Race, unlike other categories, has been
found by the Supreme Court to be a "suspect classification." This has
lead the Court to protect against race discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 79  This protected status has reached into free
exercise jurisprudence. 80
In Bob Jones University v. United States,81 a private, religious
university claimed that the United States had abridged its free exercise
rights by denying it a tax-exemption based on the school's policy of
racial discrimination, which the school claimed was based on religious
belief. The United States Supreme Court unanimously held for the
government, concluding that, "the Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education [that]
substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs."82
Many courts, in holding that preventing all forms of racial discrimi-
nation is a compelling governmental interest, have followed this case. 83
79. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court stated that any law that
classifies on the basis of race is immediately suspect and subject to strict scrutiny in terms of
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Id. at 216.
80. Protection against racial discrimination is an almost-reflexive compelling interest. Where
new modes of analysis are needed is in such areas as discrimination based on sexual orientation or
marital status, which are not entitled to as much protection from the Constitution.
81. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
82. Id. at 604.
83. Bob Jones has been explicitly followed in a plethora of cases, including: Maini v. INS, 212
F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
1999); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998); Albertson's v.
Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994); Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d
Cir. 1993); Davis v. United States, 972 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404
(8th Cir. 1988); Presbyterian & Reformed Public Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984);
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Therefore, race, as an interest, has won in its head-to-head encounter
with religion. Prevention of racial discrimination is always a compelling
interest.
VII. GENDER DISCRIMINATION
When free exercise interests are pitted against a state's interest in
preventing gender discrimination, the state almost always prevails.
Although gender is not as highly protected an interest as race in equal
protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has found that preventing
discrimination based on gender is a compelling state interest. 84
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,85 a case addressing a First
Amendment freedom of association challenge to a law restricting sex
discrimination, the Supreme Court found the state's interest in prevent-
ing sex discrimination compelling. 86 The court said, "We are persuaded
that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the stat-
ute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational free-
doms." 87 Although this case did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause
per se, the suggestion that eradication of gender discrimination is a
compelling interest would likely apply to such cases. Therefore, gender,
like race, qualifies as a superior interest.
VIII. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Supreme Court has never held that sexual orientation is a
suspect classification. 88 Further, in the recent ruling in Dale, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of "freedom of
expressive association" outweighed a state's interest in eradicating
discrimination against homosexuals. 89 The Court did not explicitly state,
however, what kind of scrutiny the state law in question deserved. This
United States v. Washington, 672 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Bethel Baptist Church v. United States,
629 F. Supp. 1073 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 578 F.
Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 326 (1997).
84. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). In a plurality opinion in Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court applied a strict scrutiny test to classifications based on
gender, giving gender as much constitutional protection against discrimination as race. Three years
later, in the majority opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court settled on a kind of
intermediate scrutiny for cases involving classifications based on gender, leaving gender not as highly
protected as race, but constitutionally protected nonetheless.
85. 462 U.S. 609 (1984).
86. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
87. Id.
88. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a more thorough discussion of the rights of
homosexuals when weighed against the Free Exercise Clause, see David B. Cruz, Piety and Preju-
dice: Free Exercise Exemption from Laws Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1176 (1994), and Richard M. Paul III & Derek Rose, The Clash Between the First Amendment
and Civil Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L. REV. 889 (1995).
89. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457 (2000).
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
leaves courts with little direction in deciding whether prevention of
discrimination against homosexuals is a compelling state interest when
weighed against free exercise rights. In its decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick,90 the Court rejected heightened due process protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment for a homosexual man who had been
charged with sodomy under a Georgia statute. 91 The Court cited the
historical prohibitions against homosexual conduct in America as reason
to allow the states to proscribe such conduct as they pleased. 92 In Romer
v. Evans,93 however, the Court found unconstitutional a Colorado consti-
tutional amendment that denied heightened protection for homosex-
uals-on equal protection grounds. The combination of these three
cases leaves discrimination based on sexual orientation in a shaky middle
ground.
Although the theory has only nominally been tested, it is unlikely
that courts will find the eradication of sexual-orientation discrimination
compelling when weighed against free exercise rights. 94 The states
themselves have laws that discriminate against homosexual couples. In
all states-with the possible exception of Vermont-same-sex couples
are not allowed to marry, while heterosexual couples, of course, can. In
some states, laws criminalizing sodomy remain on the books. As
Michael McConnell, a First Amendment expert at the University of Utah
College of Law noted, "As long as states say that heterosexuals may get
married but homosexuals may not, it's very hard to argue that a state has
a compelling interest in prohibiting an individual from making the same
kind of distinction." 95 Nonetheless, some states have laws prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 96 These laws can come into
conflict with individual free exercise rights, forcing the courts to find a
solution.
Given that sexual orientation has not been found universally com-
pelling, but is afforded some protection, state courts are left to decide
whether they find a state's interest in preventing discrimination based on
sexual orientation compelling. Because of the divergent messages that
90. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
91. Id. at 191.
92. Id. at 193.
93. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
94. See Paul & Rose, supra note 88, at 912. David Cruz thinks otherwise, although he did not
have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Dale. Cruz, supra note 88, at 1178. Given the
clear victory for freedom of association (a fundamental right commensurate with free exercise under
a RFRA) in the Dale case, it seems unlikely that a federal court using a compelling interest test would
rule in favor of an anti-discrimination law that conflicts with religious observance.
95. Steve France, Not Under My Roof You Don't, 85 A.B.A. J., 26, 28 (Apr. 1999) (quoting
McConnell). This same reasoning is what led the ACLU to withdraw its support for the passage of
state RFRAs and the federal RLPA.
96. Religious organizations may be explicitly exempted from these laws.
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the states are sending, the present qualification procedures for matrix
positioning seem useless. Judges may find the prevention of sexual
orientation discrimination compelling in a particular case, but may not
yet be willing to rule it across-the-board compelling because to do so
might help to fell all laws giving heterosexual couples rights that homo-
sexual couples are not allowed.97 New evaluation techniques that would
allow religious exercise to outweigh sexual orientation discrimination in
some situations, but not in others, are necessary.
IX. MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION
The prevention of marital status discrimination, 98 like discrimination
based on sexual orientation, is in the nebulous middle ground of
interests that may or may not be compelling. Many states discriminate
against unmarried couples in a variety of ways. Unmarried partners are
not given the same preference as married partners in intestate successions
or in insurance benefits. 99 Unmarried couples do not have the same
legal privilege of communication as married couples. 100 In some cases,
this has enabled courts to find the state's interest in eradicating dis-
crimination based on marital status less than compelling. Other courts
have reached a variety of conclusions, all of which have left marital status
without a clear place in the free exercise matrix.
Several state supreme courts, as well as the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have decided cases involving non-married couples denied tenan-
cy by landlords whose religious beliefs tell them that renting to unmar-
ried couples amounts to aiding in fornication, a sin according to many
religions. The state cases have been decided in accordance with the
housing laws and free exercise clauses of each state. In all of these cases,
however, the laws in question closely resemble the Free Exercise Clause
of the United States Constitution and the federal Fair Housing Act.
97. This would be a kind of backward equal protection analysis. If the Court found that pro-
tecting homosexuals from discrimination is a compelling state interest in a free exercise context, it
might logically also have to hold in an equal protection case that a state must have a compelling
interest to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
98. For the purposes of this note the term "marital status" will refer to either the present or past
marital status of an individual or of a heterosexual couple collectively.
99. State v. French, 460 N.w.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990).
100. Id. •
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Although Minnesota bans housing discrimination based on "mari-
tal status,"101 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. French,10 2 held a
landlord's discrimination against an unmarried couple legal under
Minnesota law. The court held that "marital status" in the statute re-
ferred to an individual's status as single, married, or divorced, not a
couple's status. In denying that Minnesota law banned marital status
discrimination based on cohabitation at all,1 03 the majority was able to
avoid deciding on the appropriate level of scrutiny under the Minnesota
Constitution in a free exercise case.
Three members of the French majority, however, went on to write
that the Minnesota Constitution provides absolute protection for reli-
gious practice unless such practice is "inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the state." 104 Writing that the state must show a compelling
and overriding interest to deny French an exemption to the housing stat-
ute, this part of the opinion found that marital status was not a compel-
ling interest, and therefore this case failed even a strict scrutiny test.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has similarly avoided definitively
deciding whether protecting unmarried couples from housing discrimi-
nation constitutes a compelling state interest. 105 In Attorney General v.
Desilets,106 the Massachusetts court ruled that summary judgement in
favor of a religious landlord was not appropriate in a free exercise case
when no finding on the existence of a "compelling" state interest had
been made by the trial court. 107 The Desilets Court refused to apply the
Smith standard in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the Massachu-
setts Constitution, however, and applied state precedent in holding that
strict scrutiny should be applied to free exercise cases. 108 Furthermore,
101. MIN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(a) (1998). It is worthwhile to note that although this statute
did not define "marital status" at the time this suit was filed, the statute was modified during the
adjudication of this suit to define "marital status" as "whether a person is single, married, remarried,
divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against
discrimination based on the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse." MINN.
STAT. § 363.01, subd. 24 (1998).
102. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
103. Id. at 6. In coming to this conclusion, the court tried to uncover the legislative intent in
banning marital status discrimination. As support for its conclusion that the legislature did not intend to
protect cohabiting couples, the court pointed to a Minnesota statute outlawing male-female
cohabitation as fornication. See MiNN. STAT. § 609.34 (1998).
104. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9. The three members of the majority again relied on the Minnesota
statute outlawing fornication in denouncing the state's claim of a "compelling interest" in eradicating
discrimination against unmarried couples. The opinion asks, "How can there be a compelling state
interest in promoting fornication when there is a statute on the books prohibiting it?" Id. at 10.
105. Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
106. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
107. Id. at240.
108. Although the court decided the appropriate level of scrutiny on state constitutional grounds,
it noted that the RFRA (which was yet to be found unconstitutional as applied to the states by Boerne)
would also have required a "compelling interest" standard. Id. at 236 n.5.
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although it did not decide whether protecting unmarried couples from
housing discrimination was a compelling interest, the court noted that
marital status did not require as much protection under the Massachu-
setts Constitution as sex, race, creed, or national origin, which are all
protected by that document explicitly. 109
In another "religious landlord discriminates against an unmarried
couple" case, the Supreme Court of Alaska sided with the couple after
holding that the Alaska Constitution required strict scrutiny.110 The
court held that the state's interest in eliminating marital status discrimi-
nation in housing was sufficiently compelling to outweigh Mr. Swan-
ner's free exercise claim. 11 The court limited the "marital status as
compelling interest" analysis to housing only, citing its commercial
nature.ll 2 Therefore, although the Swanner Court purported to use strict
scrutiny, its opinion sounds more like the early United States Supreme
Court cases that distinguished between laws regulating religious belief
and those regulating religious conduct.'13 This leaves the case with
questionable precedential value in determining how heavily the state
weighs discrimination claims against free exercise rights in other, less
commercial, situations.
Like the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Desilets, the California
Supreme Court, in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,1 l4
avoided deciding whether protecting unmarried couples from housing
discrimination is a compelling state interest. Instead, the court applied
the still-valid RFRA and held that the housing law did not "substantially
burden" the landlord's religious belief, and thus did not violate the
landlord's right to freely exercise his religion."l 5 The court set out a
three-part test for determining whether religion is "substantially
burden[ed]" by a statute: (1) it renders violation of religious belief
109. Id. at 239-40.
110. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994). This case
was decided shortly after the passage of the RFRA. The court noted that strict scrutiny analysis would
have been required under the RFRA as well.
111. Id. at 282.
112. The court also focused on the fact that Mr. Swanner's religious beliefs did not require him
to engage in the property-rental business. Therefore, the court found that his "Hobson's choice,"
between his economic livelihood and his religious beliefs, was caused by his conscious decision to
enter into a regulated field. This line of reasoning is evocative of that in Braunfeld in which the United
States Supreme Court held it unnecessary for a state to accommodate Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers'
religious belief by exempting them from Sunday closing laws.
113. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
114. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
115. Id. This holding was especially surprising in light of an earlier California case in which the
California Court of Appeals found that a landlord's religious exercise was substantially burdened
when he was forced to rent his property to "fornicators" and that the prevention of discrimination
against unmarried couples was a compelling interest. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991).
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unavoidable, (2) its avoidance would inflict more than economic costs,
and (3) an exemption would not affect a third party. 116 This analysis
seems to delve into more than the substantiality of the religious belief,
however. It is hard to imagine how a religious belief's effect on a third
party changes the substantiality of a law's burden on that belief. This
analysis, while questionable, serves as a valuable indicator of the ways in
which courts will interpret the word "substantial" in state RFRAs and
future federal laws (like a version of the RLPA). Since the fall of the
RFRA, however, the precedential value of this case is minor.' 17
In McCready v. Hoffius 1,118 the Michigan Supreme Court followed
Smith and held that the Michigan Civil Rights Act protects unmarried
couples against housing discrimination and was not violative of the Free
Exercise Clause because it is neutral and of general applicability, in
accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith. The court applied strict scrutiny under the Michigan Constitution
in holding that the state had a compelling interest in providing equal
access to housing.1l9 Thus, the court ruled that the law prohibiting
housing discrimination based on marital status did not violate the
Michigan Constitution. This decision was later vacated and remanded
for further consideration of whether the Michigan Civil Rights Act does
in fact violate the United States and Michigan Constitutions. 120
The only Federal Circuit Court case involving discrimination by a
religious landlord comes out of the Ninth Circuit: Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission. 121 There, the court used the "hybrid rights"
exception in Smith to apply strict scrutiny to a law banning marital status
discrimination by landlords. The court held that the hybrid rights excep-
tion was applicable when a free exercise violation claim combined with
another "colorable" constitutional violation claim. In this case, the
court found the landlord had a First Amendment free speech claim, as
well as a Fifth Amendment property claim. These "hybrid" rights led
the court into strict scrutiny analysis and an examination of the nature of
the governmental interest in the protection of unmarried couples from
housing discrimination.
116. Smith, 913 P.2d at 925-28.
117. The holding in Smith rested on the court's application of the RFRA to the facts of the case.
The fall of the RFRA may change the Court's stance on this issue-or it may not. The California
courts had already decided that the California Constitution requires strict scrutiny for free exercise
cases. What remains to be seen is whether California will continue to apply the "substantial burden"
requirement as strictly in the absence of a national RFRA.
118. 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998).
119. Id. at 729.
120. McCready v. Hoffius II, 593 N.W.2d 545, 545 (Mich. 1999).
121. 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999).
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In finding that the government's interest was not compelling, the
court examined what all three branches of government had done to fur-
ther the interest. 122 Unlike racial discrimination, which was outlawed by
the judicial (Brown v. Board), legislative (Civil Rights Acts), and execu-
tive branches (orders by Presidents Truman and Kennedy protecting
minorities from racial discrimination), the court found no "firm national
policy" against marital status discrimination. 123 Therefore, the court
found that the lack of protection for unmarried couples under the Equal
Protection Clause provides evidence of a lack of a "compelling" govern-
mental interest in such protection.124 Both California and Alaska are
part of the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, the Thomas decision leaves the
precedential value of Swanner and Smith in question at least as applying
to federal claims of free exercise.
The foregoing analysis makes it questionable whether a state RFRA
really changes the resolution of cases that pit free exercise against legis-
lated civil rights. It seems that, whether an RFRA comes into play or not,
protecting constitutionally recognized "discrete and insular" minori-
ties 125 will always be compelling enough to override free exercise rights.
Protecting other groups, however, might be compelling, depending on
the jurisdiction. Courts seem hesitant to find those interests (particularly
eradication of discrimination based on sexual orientation and marital
status) compelling because such an interpretation would require religious
exercise to yield to these interests in all circumstances.
X. LESSONS FROM OTHER AREAS OF LAW
There is nothing new about American courts balancing seemingly
competing interests against each other. Indeed, in a variety of conflicts
outside the area of free exercise, judges are called upon to decide cases
by looking at the specific facts 126 at issue rather than simply at the nature
122. Id. at 715.
123. Id.
124. Id. This reliance on history in deciding what is, and is not compelling, weighs very heavily
in favor of the status quo. History should have taught us, however, that historical approval does not
make all practices acceptable today. Some of the most repulsive practices in American history were
legally endorsed.
125. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
126. Professor Robert M. O'Neil proposes that courts look closer at the facts of each case in
order to distinguish different degrees of burden on religious freedom imposed by enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws. Robert M. O'Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA
Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 806 (1999). He suggests:
One need not dismiss all religiously based objections to recognize, for example, a
meaningful difference between a devout entrepreneur whose holdings include a chain of
apartment houses, and a retired couple of similar conviction who seeks suitable tenants
for a single guest bedroom in their small house .... But a court would surely recognize
that the extent of the burden imposed on the retired couple differs in degree from that
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of the rights in conflict. In deciding how to best resolve free exercise
cases involving competing interests, it is instructive to look at other areas
of the law in which two socially accepted interests (like nondiscrimi-
nation and religious freedom) intersect and how these incompatible
interests are reconciled.
In tort (and property) law, the law of private nuisance keeps one
landowner from conducting an activity that might be offensive to a
neighboring landowner. For example, one neighbor cannot play his
music to the point that it disrupts the activity of another.127 One land-
owner cannot run a hog farm if the smell is too overpowering for
another neighbor to handle.128 One neighbor cannot run a funeral
home if it interferes with his neighbor's use and enjoyment of his own
land. 129 In all of these situations, none of the activities, neither running a
hog farm nor owning a house, is illegal, or even socially unacceptable.
The two activities, when undertaken together, however, are incompatible.
So what does nuisance law do?
The law solves nuisance cases in different ways depending on the
situation. If a person purposely moves in next door to a hog farm, he
sometimes may not be able to force the farmer to move because he is
"coming to the nuisance." 130 The fact that a plaintiff has acquired his
land, after a nuisance interfering with it has come into existence, is not in
itself sufficient to bar an action, but it is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the nuisance is actionable.
If, however, a whole city builds-up right next to the hog farm, the
landowners may get an injunction against the farm and then be asked to
pay for the farm's moving expenses.131 Similarly, a court will almost
automatically grant an injunction against a funeral home in a residential
area, 132 but commercial neighbors would be much less likely to get one.
In these ways, the law picks one interest over another based on the
situation in which the nuisance occurs. 133 A hog farmer does not always
imposed upon the entrepreneur ....
Id.
127. In Mayflower Holding Co. v Warrick, 196 So. 428 (Fla. 1940), the Florida Supreme Court
held that the noises coming from a night club, including loud music and laughter, disturbed the sleep of
the patrons of complainants' hotel situated directly across the street, and therefore the complainants
were entitled to money damages for the financial loss suffered by the hotel.
128. Phillips v. Elizabethtown Butter & Cheese Factory, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 574 (1894).
129. Courts routinely grant injunctions in this situation; an example of one such case is Mutual
Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 48 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1950).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D.
131. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133. Nuisance law provides remedies for aggrieved landowners if the nuisance in question is
either intentional or unreasonable. Courts determine the unreasonableness of conduct by weighing its
burden on others against its social utility. Alternatively, if the nuisance creator could afford to
compensate others for the harm they endure without making his own conduct unfeasible, his conduct is
unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826.
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lose to a neighbor, and it would be hard to get an injunction against a
funeral home in a commercial area. What matters in these situations is
the setting.
Tort law often uses economic models to reconcile incompatible
behaviors. One relevant model is accident cost/avoidance cost analysis.
In a tort situation, if the accident cost is higher than the avoidance cost,
then the law requires that the accident be avoided. In a free exercise
case, financial cost is usually only part of the equation. Therefore,
burden can be substituted for cost and can include the mental burden
that religious issues include.
These same kind of rationales, situation and burden, can be applied
in free exercise cases. In situations in which the interests involved are in
the gray-area of constitutional protection, courts should look at the speci-
fic circumstances in which the rights compete instead of forcing one
right to win under all circumstances. Currently, courts weigh the demon-
strated societal interest in each value against each other and find one
interest consistently more valuable than another. The problem with this
type of evaluation, however, is that both free exercise rights and equal
protection rights have already been deemed of the highest societal value.
We propose that when anti-discrimination interests in the gray-area
of constitutional equal protection are pitted against free exercise inter-
ests, courts should weigh the individual burden of the competing inter-
ests, as opposed to the societal value in each interest, in deciding whether
a state's interest in preventing such discrimination is compelling in a
particular case. 134 Using this approach, the specific interests are bal-
anced in order to determine the outcome of a particular case. 135
The scenario is played out in the following example, albeit extreme.
One religious landlord owns all of the economically priced apartment
buildings in a particular town. The economy is weak, and unemployment
is high. Two single, unemployed adults decide to live together for
economic reasons, but they are unable to find an apartment because the
one landlord in town refuses to rent to unmarried couples. 136 Whose
134. This approach would only be used for interests that have some protection under state law.
Without any such protection, like a housing law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation or
marital status, the free exercise interest would always prevail. Similarly, for cases in which there is a
demonstrated state and/or federal policy in preventing discrimination based on certain characteristics,
such as race and gender, such a determination is not necessary. This approach leaves open the
possibility that a general state policy in preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation or marital
status will surface, making an individuated burden analysis such as we propose no longer necessary.
135. Professor O'Neil puts it slightly different: "Varying degrees of burden, and of severity of
impact upon religious faith and belief, are surely relevant and may guide courts in difficult cases."
O'Neil, supra note 126, at 806.
136. This kind of hypothetical was proposed by Stephanie Hammond Knutson in her article, The
Religious Landlord and the Conflict Between Free Exercise Rights and Housing Discrimination
Laws-Which Interest Prevails?, 47 HAsTINGs L.J. 1669 (1996).
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rights should prevail, those of the landlord to exercise his religious
beliefs, or those of the couple to be free from discrimination in housing?
In an individuated burden analysis, the burden of denying the couple
in this case, protection from discrimination based on marital status, is
quite high. In contrast, although the discrimination law at hand does
burden the landlord, the impact of that burden may not be as great as the
couple's burden of homelessness.
Therefore, the state has a more compelling interest in preventing
marital status discrimination in this example than it would in a more
open real estate market. This is so only because the state has already
shown an interest in generally preventing discrimination in state equal
protection clauses and in generally protecting couples from marital
status discrimination through housing laws.
In another example, the housing market is loose, and many apart-
ments are available. An unmarried couple wants to live together, and
one landlord refuses to rent to them. The couple takes the landlord to
court even though they were able to find a comparable apartment at the
same rent a block away. The interests are the same, but the burden of
the discrimination has changed. The court now has a different burden to
factor into its compelling interest determination.
This same reasoning can be persuasive when balancing the burden
of state interests against burdened free exercise interests. For instance, in
many Illinois towns, churches are required to apply for special use
permits when locating anywhere but in residential areas. 137 As many
Chicago suburbs are quite developed, however, appropriate residential
space is hard to find.138 Churches, then, are forced to locate in non-
residential areas and apply for special use permits. If these permits are
denied, the churches are unable to locate in these towns, infringing on
members' ability to worship in the towns in which they live. 139 While the
enforcement of zoning laws and the development of a strong tax base
may be a compelling state interest that outweighs a church's free
exercise rights when non-residential space is available, it may not be
here. The burden of such laws on free exercise is greater in this situation
than where residential space is available.
137. Letter from John W. Mauck, Attorney, Mauck, Bellande, Baker & O'Connell, to Rev. Jim
Queen, Chicago Metropolitan Baptist Association (Oct. 7, 1992), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/mauck.pdf. These zoning ordinances usually are motivated by a community's desire to
widen its tax base. As churches are generally tax-exempt, communities would rather have valuable
commercial space occupied by revenue-generating businesses.
138. Id.
139. One example of this situation, City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel
Church & Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53 (I11. App. Ct. 1998), a case in which the court found the
denial of a special use permit constitutional, is currently being reviewed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
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This reasoning is quite compatible with, and supports the need for,
state RFRAs. The circumstances of each case change the nature of an
RFRA's test. When nothing but commercial land is available, the burden
on religious exercise by zoning laws is much greater. When no other
affordable apartments are available to an unmarried couple, the state's
interest in keeping a landlord from discriminating against that couple is
greater. Therefore, the circumstances of the case change the weight of
the equation.
XI. CONCLUSION
In changing the analysis slightly for those interests that are not
completely protected by the Equal Protection Clause, from a general
balancing of interests to an individuated balancing of burden, RFRAs
become useful devices for allowing important civil rights to battle it out
in the courts. By looking to other areas of the law that reconcile incom-
patible, but legal, activities, courts can change the nature of free exercise
dilemmas and come to more appropriate decisions. As more states (and
possibly Congress) enact RFRAs, more and more courts will have the
opportunity to resolve conflicts between free exercise and anti-discrimi-
nation laws in new ways by taking into account not merely the nature of
the rights themselves but also the specific facts that gave rise to the
dispute in the first place. The healthy consequence of litigation in such
cases will be the clarification of the proper boundaries of religious
freedom and equal protection in American society.
2001]
* * *
